In
a well-documented and publicized case, a major Indian car manufacturer was found
to be allowing damaged car received from dealers to be reworked in the factory,
then resold off-the-record, at considerable profit to the parties concerned. The
ensuing enquiry led to considerable revamping of security procedures and heads
rolled. Better gate control/ human control procedures would have obviated these
unfortunate happenings.
One multinational household-electrical-appliance manufacturer suffered a serious
setback when one of their electrical contractors, who had been called in to
repair a fault in the air-conditioning system, worked overnight, fixed the
fault, took his payment next morning…and left, never to be contacted again.
Unfortunately, taking advantage of untidy, cluttered desks, functioning
photocopiers, open filing cabinets and logged-on computers, he left with data on
forthcoming products, which allowed local manufacturers to beat them to the
market…and the profits.
Alert and imaginative security staff can forestall break-ins through obvious
avenues. One determined break-in involved the thieves entry through the sewerage
system – once inside the perimeter, they broke open locks into administrative as
well as manufacturing facilities and walked off with not only portable physical
assets, but also sensitive income-tax/finance related files, R&D drawings,
personnel records and even canteen items. This large Indian manufacturer of
over-the-counter products was subsequently raided by IT authorities for
concealment of sales tax information, falsification of costs and using two
accounting systems. One never knows whose hands will ultimately seize purloined
information.
Disposal
of unwanted paper garbage or even stock-in-trade is another grey area.
Reserve Bank of India has a system for punching holes in, and then
burning, damaged or withdrawn-from-circulation currency notes. Yet, a few
years ago, a large number of Rupees Two-denomination currency notes, some
punched and slightly singed/ charred found themselves back in circulation!
Another example..
Open
storage has to be carefully monitored. It is highly visible and prone to
theft or even sabotage. In one of the most glaring examples, one of
India's largest munitions depots was nearly destroyed. Huge quantities of
small arms and howitzer ammunition were stored in the open, in this depot
in Rajasthan. Official enquiry revealed nothing to public gaze.
Coincidentally, a few weeks later, a large ammunition depot, across the
border with a hostile neighbor, also blew up!
Copy machines near record rooms are a gift from the gods for an operative.
They allow him to steal data without arousing suspicion due to missing papers.
One company in Eastern India dealing in tea was only able to staunch the flow
of vital data when it started monitoring photocopiers usage – and nabbed the
insider – an old and trusted employee, heavily in debt.
Snoopy neighbors can pose a serious threat. Guards of factories in industrial
areas generally hesitate to decline admission to proprietors of adjacent
factories, they being of status equivalent to their own employer. Such lack of
professionalism can be highly detrimental to security. One manufacturer of
plastic molded furniture found his new designs had been severely compromised,
when a neighbor came into his factory, distributed sweets throughout the
facility on the pretext of birth of a son and took pictures of workers….with
prototypes in final stages of development occupying a prominent portion of the
picture! Needless to say, these designs, with minor changes, found their way
into another factory in a neighboring town whose owner was closely related to
the infiltrator.
You lose control of (no longer benefit from) security environment, once outside
your own facilities. Many organizations presume they are targeted by corporate
espionage agents, and take whatever precautions are possible. They speak in
code, keep TV set on loudly to confuse bugs, and avoid open places. Many
multinationals, who host management Development Seminars or secret ‘strategy
planning retreats', select such remote, normally – inaccessible sites, such as
Mithun Charavarty's Ooty hotel – as to dodge all but the most ingenious and
resourceful ‘agent'. An ITC ‘management retreat' was almost compromised (at
Andamans) when the chief security officer fell ill and had to be urgently
replaced - by an accomplished operative with an army/RAW background – who would
have got away with a good haul of data had he not made a mistake born of over
confidence. He was snooping around in a hotel room, opening briefcases, when the
occupant came back to fetch some papers he'd forgotten to take. Questioning
revealed that ITC had been targeted by a rival tobacco company to get at
important information on ITC's diversification plans.
Physical vulnerabilities are therefore, by their very nature,
myriad in their possibilities. Apply a little imagination and forethought, and
you could avoid most of them.
